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1I - INTRODUCTION
While cross-border investment flows are surging to levels not witnessed since before the Great
Depression, the evaluation of political risk inherent in these projects has changed little since the
1960s.  Since 1983, foreign direct investment inflows to developing countries have increased
five-fold.  From 1989 to 1992, the stock of American affiliates infrastructure assets grew by
153% leading to the share of total assets invested in infrastructure doubling from 1.6% to 3.0%. 
While this is but a fraction of the peak of 22% reached in 1940, recent research by the World
Bank suggests that more than $2.0 trillion of new infrastructure will be required in East Asia and
Latin America alone during the next ten years1.  As developing countries have increasingly
reopened their doors to foreign capital for such projects, multinational corporations need to
carefully weigh the potential costs and benefits of reentering markets in which previous waves of
investments were expropriated.
Political risk analysis attempts to unpack the complex relationship between social and political
institutions and economic outcomes.  The institutional environment consists of the formal and
informal rules of the game that determine the incentives for individual behavior.  Thus, the
institutional environment provides the structure for exchange that, together with the technology
employed, determines the cost of doing business.  Institutional environments that fail to offer
credible commitments against arbitrary changes in the rules of the game, including expropriation,
raise transaction costs throughout the economy.  Transaction costs also vary within an
institutional environment according to the politicization of the transaction and the returns to the
firm from using the asset in its next best use.
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 United Nations, 1996.
2This paper analyzes the interaction of the institutional endowment of a country and investment in
an industry with extremely high politicization and sunk costs: electric utilities.  It links
quantifiable differences in institutional environments across a wide sample of nations to
investment decisions in their respective utility sectors.  Providing credible commitments against
arbitrary decision making by the state, that may impact on the profitability of these investments,
through the existence of a number of independent constraints on executive behavior creates a
better environment for utility investment.  Managers considering investment in infrastructure
projects should therefore evaluate the investment proposal not only on its explicit terms but also
on the likelihood that the government will honor them.
II - INSTITUTIONS AND THE PERFORMANCE OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES
Institutions are the formal and informal rules that constrain individual behavior and shape human
interaction (North, 1990).  They are humanly devised constraints that structure political,
economic and social relationships.  Throughout history institutions have been devised to create
order and reduce uncertainty in exchange (North, 1991).  Together with the standard constraints
of economics, they define the choice set and therefore determine transaction and production
costs, and hence the profitability and feasibility of engaging in economic activity.  In particular,
complex forms of economic organization or transactions involving high politicization and/or
sunk costs will be increasingly disadvantaged as the institutional environment degrades.
Three features of the electric utility industry combine to create complex contracting problems of
an inherently political nature.  First, the technology involves large specific, sunk investments;
second, it is characterized by important economies of scale and scope; and third, outputs are
massively consumed. These features have traditionally raised the need for governmental
3regulation of utilities.2 Since a large component of infrastructure investment is sunk3, once the
investment is undertaken the operator will be willing to continue operating as long as operating
revenues exceed operating costs.  Since operating costs do not include a return on sunk
investments (but only on the alternative value of these assets), the operating company will be
willing to operate even if prices are below total average costs.  Economies of scale imply that in
most infrastructure services, there will be few suppliers in each locality. Finally, the fact that
infrastructure services tend to be massively consumed implies that politicians and interest groups
will care about the level of infrastructure pricing. Thus, massive consumption, economies of
scale and sunk investments provide governments (either national or local) with the incentive to
behave opportunistically vis-à-vis the investing company.4
For example, after the investment is sunk, the government may try to restrict the operating
company’s pricing flexibility, may require the company to undertake special investments,
purchasing or employment patterns, or may try to restrict the movement of capital. All these are
attempts to expropriate the company’s specific investments by administrative measures. Thus,
expropriation may be indirect and undertaken by subtle means. While the government may
uphold and protect traditionally conceived property rights. it may still attempt to expropriate
through regulatory procedures.
Sunk assets’ expropriation may be profitable for a government if the direct costs (such as
reputation loss vis-à-vis other utilities or lack of future investments by utilities) are small
compared to the short-term benefits of such action (such as achieving re-election by reducing
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 See, among others, North (1990), Williamson (1988), Goldberg (1976), Barzel (1989),
Spiller (1993), and Levy and Spiller (1994).

 Specific or sunk investments are those that once undertaken their productive value in
alternative uses is substantially below their investment cost.
4utilities’ prices or by attacking the monopoly), and if the indirect institutional costs (that is,
disregard of the judiciary or not following the proper administrative procedures) are not too large
(Spiller, 1996). Thus, incentives for expropriation of sunk assets should be expected to be largest
in countries where there are no formal or informal governmental procedures required for
regulatory decisionmaking; where regulatory policy is centralized in the administration; where
the judiciary does not have the tradition or the power to review administrative decisions; and
where the government’s horizon is relatively short.5
Private investors (as well as public company managers) knowing that under some circumstances,
governments may not be able to refrain from reneging on explicit or implicit agreements (i.e.,
behave opportunistically), will undertake actions to protect their investments. In particular, to
protect their assets, investors will invest in less specific assets. Thus, less efficient, but more
flexible technologies may be chosen, limiting the social value of the enterprise (Zelner, 1997).
Alternatively, firms may alter the organizational form of their international operations so as to
create safeguards against opportunistic behavior by other private parties or by the governmnent
(Henisz, 1997).  In an extreme case, private investment will not take place at all, and public
ownership may become the default mode of organization.
III - CROSS-NATION ANALYSIS
Most of the empirical work on the relationship among political institutions, regulatory
commitment, and utility economic performance consists of case studies.  These are generally
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 Observe that this incentive exists vis-à-vis public and private companies.

 Salant and Woroch (1992), Salant (1995), and Gilbert and Newbery (1988) have
observed that concerns for future gains from cooperation can outweigh the short-run
temptations of opportunism. This conclusion, which draws from the literature on repeated
games, rests on the premise that firms and regulatory commissions have infinite horizons.
5focused on the telecommunications sector6, and deal with how governments differ in their
perceptions of and their abilities to communicate credible commitments (see, for example, Levy
and Spiller (1996), Gilbert and Kahn (1996) and Ramamurti (1996)). The purpose here, though,
is to empirically implement the framework developed above by exploiting the differences across
nations in their institutional environments and linking them to their respective utilities
investment decisions.  Thus, the cross-nation analysis proposed here is an attempt to shed light
on the role of political institutions and the ability of governments to commit to stable and non-
opportunistic regulatory policies, and its impact on sector’s performance.
III.1 - MEASURING THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Levy and Spiller (1994) develops a framework to analyze the interaction of the institutional
endowment of a country, the nature of its regulatory institutions, and the performance of the
sector. They emphasize that the credibility and effectiveness of a regulatory framework (and
hence its ability to facilitate private investment) vary with a country’s political and social
institutions; and that performance can be satisfactory with a wide range of regulatory procedures,
as soon as three complementary mechanisms restraining arbitrary administrative action are all in
place: (1) substantive restraints on the discretion of the regulator, (2) formal or informal
constraints on changing the regulatory system, and (3) institutions that enforce the above formal
(substantive and procedural) constraints.7
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 One exception is Vogel’s (1986) analysis of environmental policies in Great Britain and
the United States. He attributes political institutions an important role in explaining
different “national styles of regulation”.

 Issues like regulatory uncertainty, costly disputes between regulators and firms, and poor
systems of arbitration are also discussed in Bishop, Kay and Mayer (1995).
6The basic political institutions of a country refers to the nature of its judiciary, and of its
legislative and executive institutions.8 In particular, an independent and professional judiciary is
a natural candidate for satisfying the condition of enforcing formal constraints. A politically
corrupt judiciary will be unlikely to side against the government on sensitive matters. Thus,
judicial independence and professionalism imply a more confident framework for enforcing
contracts.9
Countries can also be divided between those with unified and those with divided governments. In
unified governments, the party in power also controls the legislative process. Parliamentary
systems with electoral rules that systematically bring a majority party to government are
considered unified. Similarly, those Presidential systems that align presidential elections with
legislative elections, and that are developed so as to provide the President with a working
majority in the legislature are also taken as unified.10 Divided governments, on the other hand,
are parliamentary systems that systematically need to form governments by coalition as electoral
rules are such that party proliferation preempts a single party from achieving a majority in the
legislature. Similarly, Presidential systems with electoral rules that systematically elect
Presidents without a tight control of the legislature are categorized as divided governments.
Other indicators of divided governments include the degree of federalism11, the number of
legislative chambers elected under independent electoral rules, the degree of development of
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 Analyses on bureaucracy discretion, congressional influence, commitment, and the
interaction among politicians, interest groups and regulators can be found in Weingast
and Moran (1983), Ferejohn and Shipan (1990), Spulber and Besanko (1992), and Spiller
(1990).

 On judicial review and regulator’s discretion, see Spiller (1992).

 For an excellent treatment of legislative and executive institutions, see Shugart and
Carey (1992).

 See Weingast (1994).
7political parties and the length of experience with stable democratic elections.  Each of these
measures increases the need for consultation and agreement among institutionally independent
entities before status quo policies may be changed.  In pure unified governments, rules designed
by a government can be changed unilaterally by the next government. In divided governments, on
the other hand, changes in government may not provide the new government the ability to
reverse prior regulatory policies. Thus, the credibility of a regulatory policy is stronger in divided
than in unified systems. Managers of utilities can therefore forecast more confidently and are
more likely to base their economic decisions on non-political considerations.  Sector performance
is therefore expected to be stronger in divided than in unified government
Apart from the basic institutions of government, Levy and Spiller (1994) emphasize the role of
the character of the contending social interest within a society and the balance between them. In
particular, the more contentious the contending social interests, the higher the potential for
reversing government policies. The higher the political instability of a country, the higher the
potential for opportunistic behavior by governments, and hence the more inefficient will the
performance of the sector be.12
Finally, Levy and Spiller (1994) stress the importance of administrative capabilities. In principle,
the higher the administrative capabilities of the nation, the higher the potential sophistication of
the regulatory regime, and hence the higher the performance of the sector.
III.2 - THE DATA
In order to implement the analysis, data on electric utility investment and information for each
country concerning its basic political institutions was needed. Besides, other variables helping to
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 For a similar treatment of the problem as applied to inflation and fiscal deficits, see
8control for some structural features of the sector were also useful.  (See Appendix I for a detailed
description of the database.)
The primary independent variable is an index of political credibility derived from three
component variables: judicial effectiveness, formal constraints on executive discretion and
informal constraints on executive discretion.  The efficiency and integrity of the legal
environment determines the ability of business to rely on an impartial and timely third party
dispute resolution mechanism in the case of a dispute with the government. Where courts are
corrupt or politically compromised, businesses must devise alternative safeguards to government
expropriation of returns such as the use of highly mobile assets13, foreign political risk loan
guarantees from OPIC or the World Bank, or explicit/implicit profit sharing agreements with
government officials.  Each of these measures raises the costs of doing business relative to
operating in an environment in which neoclassical contract law operates effectively. The degree
of independence and strength of the court system and the judiciary institutions is captured by the
law and order and legal systems indicators. A more objective measure of judicial independence is
also derived from a survival analysis of the tenure of justices on the Supreme Court.  Supreme
Courts whose justices have average tenures lower than those of political leaders are unlikely to
rule against the current government in a sensitive dispute.  Median tenure of supreme or high
court justices may thus be used as a proxy measure for judicial independence.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Edwards and Tabellini (1991a) and (1991b).

 Despite recent improvements in the institutional environment of the Philippines,
investors are still wary of investing in easily expropriable power plants.  Their solution
has been to place the plants on floating barges which can be moved from one region to
another or, potentially, even leave the country if the political environment turns sour.
(Economist, 8/17/96).
9Formal constraints on executive power consists of Constitutional checks and balances or veto
points within and between the executive and legislative branches.  The existence of federal units
or a bicameral legislature elected under independent voting rules increases the number of
independent parties from whom the executive must seek approval before implementing changes
in status quo policies. Similarly, the existence of an effective legislature (one that offers a
legitimate counterweight to executive power) especially one who has constitutional parity with
the executive decreases the likelihood of policy change.  The explicit or implicit unification of
state, military and religious power increases the range of discretion of the government as it
reduces the likelihood of organized opposition to state policies.  By contrast, strong development
of political parties that transcend individual personalities and policies can enhance the potential
for such opposition and serve as a check on government discretion.
The institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that tends to
minimize revisions of policy when governments change. This is what the bureaucracy quality
index measures. High risk points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength
and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services.
In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tend to be somewhat autonomous from political
pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruiting and training. Countries that lack the
cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low risk rating points because a change in
government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative
functions.
Government corruption is also a threat to private investment for several reasons: it distorts the
economic and financial investment, it reduces the efficiency of government and business by
10
enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability, and
introduces an inherent instability into the political process. In order to construct the corruption
indicator, the International Country Risk Guide staff look first at how long a government has
been in power continuously. In the case of a one-party state or non-elected government,
corruption, in the form of patronage and nepotism, is an essential prerequisite and is therefore
corrupt, to a greater or lesser degree, from its inception. In the case of a democratic government,
they suggest that things tend to go wrong after an elected government has been in office for more
than two consecutive terms. On that basis, the highest risk ratings tend to signify a democratic
country whose government has been in office for less than five years, and where government
officials do not often seek special payments. An intermediate rating indicates a country whose
government has been in office for more than ten years, where a large number of officials are
appointed rather than elected, and bribery demands are fairly frequent. The lowest ratings are
given to countries that are usually are non-democratic, where the government has been in power
for more than ten years, high government officials are likely to demand special payments, and
illegal payments are generally accepted throughout the society. Finally, the existence of severe
racial or national tensions introduces an additional level of required compromise in political
decisions as the benefits and costs to various racial, ethnic or religious groups must be carefully
weighed to avoid exacerbating existing conditions.
Information on all political variables except judicial tenure was available for 87 of the 91
countries in our sample. Judicial tenure was available for only 38 countries.  It must be noted that
some political variables are highly correlated. Appendix Table 1 shows the correlation matrix
among the eleven political indexes available for the countries under scrutiny. In order to avoid
severe multicollinearity problems arising from this correlation among political variables, two
11
political indexes (POL and POL2) were defined as the weighted sum of the corresponding
variables from each category for each country14. (See Appendix 2 for values of composite
variables for each country.)
Non-political control variables were also included in the analysis. In particular, an increase in
population, income, and percentage of urbanization should induce higher investment by utilities.
A larger proportion of industrial customers (reflected by a larger fraction of the gross domestic
product corresponding to industrial production) implies a higher potential for co-generation and a
more even demand for electricity.  Thus, holding personal  income constant, there would be a
reduction in the need for generation capacity.  Energy sources will also influence utilities
investment.  Hydroelectric plants require high initial capital costs relative to operating cost,
which will be reflected on higher investment.  Finally, more stable and less risky political
environments should lead to stronger incentives to invest in this sector.  Summary statistics for
all variables used in the analysis are presented in Appendix 3.
III.3 - RESULTS
The main results are shown in Table 1.  Well defined and credible political institutions are
positively and significantly correlated with global electricity generating capacity (taken here as
proxy of investment decisions).  If a country at the average level of political constraints such as
Thailand or Ecuador were to improve their level of commitment by one standard deviation to
arrive at the level of political constraints currently held by Portugal or the United Kingdom, all
else equal, their generating capacity would increase by 1.2 MW per 1000 population (40% of one
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 POL = (LAW + 1/7 (FED + DUAL + BICAM + LEGEFF + MILIT + REL + PART)
+ 1/3 (BUREAU + CORRUP + TENS) )
POL2 = (JUDTEN + 1/7 (FED + DUAL + BICAM + LEGEFF + MILIT + REL + PART)
+ 1/3 (BUREAU + CORRUP + TENS) )
12
standard deviation), implying an elasticity at mean values of 49%.  Of the non-political control
variables, both income and percent of generating capacity from hydroelectric power are also
positively and significantly correlated with generating capacity.
One important question is the extent to which these results are particular to the measure of the
institutional environment derived in this paper.  Alternative measures used in other recent
publications were also examined for their predictive power.  The regression using the index of
five political risk variables (ICRG5) from The International Country Risk Guide15 is reported in
column II and provides very similar results to those in column 1, although its explanatory power
is slightly better than that of column I. The summary variable from the Polity III database
(EXECCON) which purports to measure the level of formal constraints on executive discretion
and other political measures less closely tied to the notion of credible commitment including the
Polity measure on democracy and the Gastil indexes of political and civil rights perform less
effectively (note that the Gastil index is lower for countries with more rights explaining the
inversion in sign).
Table 2 presents a similar set of analysis for the 38 country sample16 for which data is available
on judicial tenure.  These results suggest that judicial independence should be considered
alongside other formal and informal contraints on executive discretion in the determination of the
risk in investing in the infrastructure of developing countries.  Indeed, comparing columns I and
II suggest that judicial tenure tells most of the story told by the other political variables.  From
column III we find that a country at the median level of our modified constraint measure such as
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 Law and order, bureaucratic quality, government corruption, contract repudiation and
government expropriation
16
 This sample is not substantially different from the larger sample as is evidenced by the
summary statistics in Appendix Table 3 and the replication of the regressions presented in Table
13
Jamaica or Botswana which increased its level of constraints on executive discretion by one
standard deviation to the level of Malaysia or Ireland would be expected to increase its
generating capacity by 1.24 MW per 1000 population (47% of a standard deviation), implying
again a 49% elasticity at the mean.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
1 for the smaller sample presented in Appendix Table 4. 
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Table 117
Dependent Variable: Log of Total Generating Capacity in
Megawatts per Thousand Population (LCAPPC)
N 87 87 87 86 86
CONSTANT
LGDPPC
LIND
LURBAN
LHYDRO
POL
ICRG5
EXECCON
DEMOCR
GASTIL
-1.04
(-5.06)
0.17
(5.48)
-0.11
(-1.65)
-0.01
(-0.26)
0.04
(2.65)
0.30
(4.92)
-1.08
(-5.38)
.16
(4.93)
-0.15
(-2.20)
0.05
(0.64)
0.05
(2.84)
0.17
(5.33)
-0.94
(-3.82)
.27
(10.30)
-0.16
(-1.99)
-0.08
(-0.94)
0.03
(1.80)
0.02
(1.29)
-0.90
(-3.48)
.27
(9.69)
-0.16
(-1.99)
-0.07
(-0.87)
0.03
(1.78)
0.01
(1.20)
-0.69
(-2.09)
.26
(9.08)
-0.15
(-1.97)
-0.08
(-0.98)
0.03
(1.67)
-0.03
(-1.56)
R2(adjusted)
F-stat.
0.82
79.94
0.83
83.71
0.77
59.28
0.77
59.08
0.77
59.28
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 The methodology followed is that of ordinary least squares.
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Table 218
Dependent Variable: Log of Total Generating Capacity in
Megawatts per Thousand Population (LCAPPC)
N 38 38 38
CONSTANT
LGDPPC
LIND
LURBAN
LHYDRO
JUDTEN
POL
POL2
-1.61
(-3.42)
0.27
(5.25)
-0.05
(-0.35)
-0.11
(-0.77)
0.12
(3.24)
0.59
(2.94)
-1.48
(-3.09)
0.21
(3.13)
-0.07
(-0.43)
-0.09
(-0.62)
0.12
(3.32)
0.52
(2.55)
0.15
(1.18)
-1.46
(-3.18)
0.21
(3.40)
-0.07
(-0.44)
-0.09
(-0.64)
0.12
(3.37)
0.33
(3.23)
R2(adjusted)
F-stat.
0.82
36.64
0.83
31.15
0.83
38.51
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 The methodology followed is that of ordinary least squares.
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IV - IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This analysis has important implications for firms considering investment in the infrastructure of
developing countries as well as policymakers seeking to attract foreign investment to such
investments.  The credibility and effectiveness of a regulatory system (and hence its ability to
facilitate private investment) vary with a country’s political and social institutions.  Increasing
the number of independent checks on executive power especially through an independent judicial
system improves the framework for utility investment.  Utility performance can be satisfactory as
soon as substantive restraints on the discretion of the regulator, formal or informal constraints on
changing the regulatory system, and institutions that enforce the above formal (substantive and
procedural) constraints are present.
Firms choosing between alternative international investment opportunities should carefully
weigh the extent to which such constraints restrict policy changes by the government in the
present and in the future.  The greater the number of independent veto points against policy
changes the greater the likelihood that initial contracts will be honored.  An independent and
respected judiciary with a track record of successfully ruling against the government is an
important prerequisite to a government’s ability to credibly commit to contract terms.  Firms
should therefore examine the tenure length of justices at the relevant court and their employment
histories and prospects to determine the likelihood that they will be given a fair hearing in the
event of contractual disputes.  Should the executive change hands, the existence of one (or two)
independent and effective legislatures, federalist institutions and a professional and competent
administrative apparatus can insure policy stability even in the face of regime change.
17
Policymakers in developing countries seeking to attract foreign investors to large sunk and
politically sensitive sectors should recognize that contractual terms, tax incentives and subsidies
only function to the extent that they are credible.  In the absence of substantive constraints on the
government reneging on contract terms, investment will remain offshore.  At the extreme, the
public sector itself will have to fund operations which could more efficiently and profitably be
managed by  private firms.  Improvements in the political and legal environment (and thus, in the
regulatory commitment and the country’s credibility) should therefore be a relevant ingredient in
the analysis of both policymakers and investors seeking to expand private sector involvement in
infrastructure projects in developing countries.
18
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Appendix I: Variables Used in Econometric Analysis
The variables used in this econometric analysis were taken from different sources, including
World Bank and OECD tables on electricity prices, world resources, structural features of the
countries, and the like; the political data compiled by Ted Gurr in the Polity Dataset; tables of the
International Country Risk Guide; and published sources such as Gorvin (1989) and Derbyshire
and Derbyshire (1996).
The endogenous variable is defined in the following way:
LCAPPC log of the sum of public and private electricity generating capacity per thousand   
                        population
The non-political variables used as explanatory variables are:
LGDPPC log of the country’s GDP per capita;
LIND log of the proportion of industry product in total GDP;
LURBAN log of country’s urbanization percentage;
LHYDRO log of the proportion of electricity generated using hydro sources;
The political variables19 taken into consideration are the following (unless otherwise noted,
higher score imply improvements in the institutional environment’s ability to credibly commit) :
Judicial Independence
JUDTEN tenure of justices on the high or supreme court as a percentage of the United
States from Henisz (1997);
LAW index of law and order tradition including sound political institutions, a strong
court system and provisions for an orderly succession of power from International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG)20;
                                                          

 Note that recent similar empirical work in macroeconomic growth (Knack and Keefer
(1995), Mauro (1995), Barro (1996), Borner, Brunetti and Weder (1996), Campos and
Nugent (1996) and La Porta et. al. (1997) ) and international business (Agarwal and
Ramaswami (1992), Brouthers (1995), and Oxley (1995) ) has focussed on measures of
economic outcomes such as government expropriation of private sector assets,
repudiation of contracts by government, manager’s perception of political risk and patent
protection.  The measures developed here differ in that they explicitly examine the role of
political institutions as determinants of economic outcomes.

 Note that similar results were obtained using the measure of effectiveness of the legal
system from Mauro (1995) and are available from the author upon request.
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Formal Constraints on Executive Discretion
FED dummy variable for federalist states from Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996) 
(D&D);
DUAL dummy variable for dual executives (parity of executive and legislature) from
Banks supplemented by D&D (Banks and D&D);
BICAM dummy variable for bicameral legislatures from Banks and D&D;
LEGEFF index of legislature’s effectiveness from Banks and D&D;
MILIT index of participation in government by military from ICRG;
REL index of participation in government by organized religion from ICRG;
PART Degree of development of political parties from Polity Database;
Informal Constraints on Executive Discretion
BUREAU index of quality of the bureaucracy from ICRG;
CORRUP index of corruption in government from ICRG;
TENS index of prevalence of racial/nationalist tensions from ICRG.
Robustness was examined by testing alternative specifications of the institutional environment
including the following measures:
ICRG5 sum of five ICRG variables including LAW, BUREAU and CORRUP (defined
above) and:
REPUD index of likelihood of modification of contracts with foreign
businesses;
EXPROP index of likelihood of outright confiscation and forced
nationalization;
EXECCON index of the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers
of chief executives imposed by any “accountability groups” including legislatures,
councils, advisors, military or a strong independent judiciary from Polity;
DEMOCR index of institutionalized democracy composed by examining three
interdependent elements: (1) the presence of institutions and procedures through
which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and
leaders; (2) existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of executive
power; and (3) guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens from Polity; and
GASTIL sum of Gastil indexes of political and civil liberties which measure freedom and
fairness of elections, including the existence of competitive parties and an
independent opposition, and individual freedoms and opportunities of the
individual respectively.  Note that, unlike all previous indexes, a higher score
represents a diminution in the institutional environment.
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APPENDIX Table 1
Correlation Matrix for Political Variables
FED 0.35 1.00
DUAL 0.16 -0.02 1.00
BICAM 0.22 0.41 0.10 1.00
PART 0.72 0.28 0.19 0.35 1.00
LEGEFF 0.57 0.30 0.24 0.67 0.78 1.00
MILIT 0.70 0.38 0.13 0.42 0.66 0.65
REL 0.41 0.08 0.06 0.15 0.43 0.38
BUREAU 0.81 0.28 0.24 0.39 0.68 0.61
CORRUP 0.82 0.25 0.15 0.24 0.65 0.58
TENS 0.48 -0.06 0.03 0.11 0.49 0.33
MILIT 1.00
REL 0.47 1.00
BUREAU 0.74 0.35 1.00
CORRUP 0.71 0.45 0.79 1.00
TENS 0.32 0.48 0.41 0.48 1.00
APPENDIX Table 2: Composite Political Variable Scores in 1987
COUNTRY POL POL2 COUNTRY POL POL2 COUNTRY POL POL2
Algeria 1.24 Japan 2.54 Uganda 0.63
Argentina 1.79 Jordan 1.26 U.K. 2.32 1.67
Australia 2.75 2.54 Kenya 1.64 1.19 U.S.A. 2.87 2.94
Austria 2.62 Korea 1.43 Uruguay 1.78
Bangladesh 0.62 0.95 Luxembourg 2.63 Venezuela 2.09
Belgium 2.61 2.36 Madagascar 1.66 Yemen, A.R. 0.98
Bolivia 0.97 Malawi 1.31 1.02 Yugoslavia 1.31
Botswana 2.09 1.46 Malaysia 1.95 2.15 Zambia 1.15 1.02
Brazil 2.13 1.63 Mali 0.92 Zimbabwe 1.35 1.04
Burkina Faso 1.40 Mexico 1.81 1.16
Cameroon 1.36 0.94 Morocco 1.37
Canada 2.78 2.52 Mozambique 1.52
Chile 1.51 1.21 Netherlands 2.74 2.33
China 1.51 New Zealand 2.63 2.53
Colombia 1.45 0.88 Nicaragua 1.34 1.23
Congo 1.24 Niger 1.62
Costa Rica 2.11 Nigeria 0.74 1.17
Cote D’Ivoire 1.72 Norway 2.63 2.60
Denmark 2.69 Pakistan 1.09 0.90
Dominican R. 1.58 1.07 Panama 1.16
Ecuador 1.71 1.00 Papau N.G. 1.91
Egypt 1.25 Paraguay 1.13 0.65
El Salvador 1.05 Peru 1.01 0.83
Ethiopia 1.15 Philippines 1.00 0.89
Finland 2.83 Poland 1.60
France 2.52 1.78 Portugal 2.24
Gabon 1.37 Senegal 1.28
Germany (West) 2.58 2.26 Sierra Leone 1.43
Ghana 0.90 0.89 Somalia 1.48
Greece 1.79 Spain 1.99
Guatemala 0.86 0.57 Sri Lanka 1.27 1.10
Guinea 1.18 Sudan 0.93 1.01
Guinea Bissau 0.96 Sweden 2.69
Honduras 1.21 0.82 Switzerland 2.86
Hungary 2.01 Syria 1.11
India 1.42 1.14 Tanzania 1.43
Indonesia 0.77 Thailand 1.61
Ireland 2.13 2.24 Togo 1.13
Italy 2.22 1.99 Tunisia 1.33
Jamaica 1.60 1.66 Turkey 1.49
Appendix Table 3: Summary Statistics for Variables Included in Regressions
N = 87 lcappc lpop lgdppc lind lurban lhydro pol icrg5 execcon democr gastil
Mean 0.39 9.53 7.24 3.37 3.83 3.23 1.65 2.92 4.38 4.77 3.68
Median 0.18 9.30 7.03 3.43 3.91 3.71 1.49 2.67 4.00 5.00 3.75
Max 1.96 13.88 10.17 3.97 4.58 4.61 2.87 5.00 7.00 10.00 7
Min 0.01 5.92 4.38 2.20 2.56 0.00 0.62 1.03 1.00 0.00 1.00
St. Dev. 0.45 1.41 1.58 0.38 0.50 1.31 0.61 1.11 2.41 4.44 2.00
N = 38 lcappc lpop lgdppc lind lurban lhydro pol icrg5 execcon democr gastil judten pol2
Mean 0.44 9.89 7.40 3.43 3.94 3.54 1.69 2.95 4.95 5.82 3.13 0.40 1.46
Median 0.23 9.71 7.07 3.45 4.07 3.84 1.55 2.55 6.00 7.50 2.65 0.31 1.18
Max 1.96 13.59 9.91 3.87 4.58 4.61 2.87 5.00 7.00 10.00 6.50 1.00 2.94
Min 0.02 7.78 4.96 2.83 2.56 0.01 0.62 1.03 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.57
St. Dev. 0.49 1.34 1.55 0.27 0.50 0.97 0.66 1.21 2.32 4.12 1.64 0.25 0.65
Appendix Table 4
Dependent Variable: Log of Total Generating Capacity in
Megawatts per Thousand Population (LCAPPC)
N 39 39 39 39 38
CONSTANT
LGDPPC
LIND
LURBAN
LHYDRO
POL
ICRG5
EXECCON
DEMOCR
GASTIL
-1.36
(-2.64)
0.27
(3.78)
-0.01
(-0.05)
-0.24
(-1.66)
0.11
(2.68)
0.23
(1.77)
-1.45
(-2.86)
0.27
(3.90)
0.02
(0.11)
-0.22
(1.51)
.10
(2.47)
.12
(1.75)
-1.51
(-2.79)
0.36
(8.12)
0.02
(0.10)
-0.30
(-2.11)
.10
(2.40)
.01
(0.29)
-1.42
(-2.54)
0.36
(7.76)
0.00
(0.01)
-0.31
(-2.13)
.10
(2.43)
.00
(0.67)
-1.28
(-1.88)
0.36
(7.01)
0.02
(0.10)
-0.32
(-2.24)
.10
(2.31)
-.02
(-0.67)
R2(adjusted)
F-stat.
0.80
30.90
.80
30.84
0.78
27.75
0.78
28.11
0.78
27.98
